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Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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United States statement

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Mr. Chairman,

My delegation recognizes the effort you and your staff, including the Bureau representatives Ambassador Molnar and Ambassador Bonnier, have made in compiling this Summary. The last session of the Preparatory Committee before a Review Conference is no simple affair, and my delegation appreciates the hard work and dedication that you have contributed to this endeavor.

I also want to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to recognize your personal efforts over the past year in preparing for your task as Chairman. My delegation appreciates these efforts, including your co-sponsorship with Japan of the NPT workshop in Jakarta in March. We look forward to continue working with you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as a member of the NPT Bureau.

Mr. Chairman, we have reviewed your Summary. We agree that the full and effective implementation of the NPT is vital to international peace and security. We note some appropriate references to today's serious threats to the NPT, and to the importance of strict compliance and enforcement to meet these threats. We are pleased with the recognition that the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as stated in the Treaty must be in conformity with Articles I, II, and III. The Summary also reflects the importance we all attach to IAEA safeguards, especially the Additional Protocol, and the need for effective nuclear export controls and safety measures. We welcome the references to the Global Partnership and to UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Finally, the account of the importance of achieving complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program is fair and balanced.

However, we have concluded that the Summary has fundamental strategic weaknesses. Though purporting to be a Summary of the discussions of this session of our Committee, it fails to

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reflect in an accurate and balanced manner the substance of our deliberations on compliance with nonproliferation obligations and on disarmament. It has attributed to all States Parties views that were held only by some participating states. It fails to reflect, in whole or in part, contrasting views on many issues. The continuing, erroneous assertion that "States Parties" agreed, stressed, affirmed or emphasized an issue mischaracterizes the substance and thrust of the speeches and discussions that have occurred in this room. It suggests consensus when none was reached.

Many things have been said here on different sides of many issues. One would not know this from the Summary, however. Contrary to the Summary, the United States has made clear that it does not support all 13 practical steps from the 2000 Final Document, and does not assign a higher priority to promotion of peaceful uses than to nuclear nonproliferation or evaluate the NPT's operation mainly on the basis of Article VI. There are many other examples. The approach of using State Parties with no qualification has led to serious problems of characterization and misinterpretation.

We do not support a mechanism to promote implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The Middle East is a serious issue. Unfortunately, the Summary does not take account of the complicated set of issues, the noncompliance obstacles, or the peace efforts that have been undertaken.

Fundamentally, the Summary fails to recognize the degree of crisis that the NPT faces and that we, as States Parties, must confront. We must face the fact that in the past 15 years, at least four non-nuclear-weapon states have sought nuclear weapon capabilities in violation of Articles II and III of the NPT. In the past two years, new nuclear weapons programs have been uncovered in two countries along with a major illicit nuclear procurement network. The discovery of this network raises questions about whether one, or more, other states could be engaged in similar clandestine efforts that would pose a threat to each and every state represented in this room. The summary simply fails to reflect the gravity of this crisis or the urgency of a firm and swift response. Without a strong commitment to enforcement of NPT obligations, the Treaty will be progressively undermined. Many countries spoke eloquently to these issues and made concrete proposals for strengthening the Treaty. The Summary does not adequately take these views into account and is a profound misrepresentation of our debate.

We are particularly dismayed at the paragraph dealing with Iran. While the Summary calls for strengthening the IAEA Board of Governors and its role in chronicling abuse of safeguards, it falls very far below the standard set by the Board in its repeated reports and resolutions over the past year. IAEA reports have described in striking detail a systematic, clandestine effort by Iran over a long period to acquire a fissile material production capability, which we believe is in direct support of a nuclear weapons program. Compare Iran's statements at the 2003 PrepCom with the facts discovered by the IAEA since, including breaches of Iran's obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement, and you will find conclusive evidence that Iran's assertions last year were far from the truth.

Yet the Summary recounts Iran's promises favorably and uses "States Parties" in the context of a positive reference to Iran – but attributes concerns about Iran's clandestine nuclear activities only to "some States Parties." This is not an accurate summary of what was said here. It ignores many references by delegations to three consensus resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors. By ignoring all of this, this paragraph tends to undermine the strong support expressed elsewhere in the Summary for the IAEA. Just this week the IAEA Director-General reminded Iran again publicly that the world will not wait forever for Iran to meet its obligations. This PrepCom should not show itself to be less concerned about Iran's flouting of its NPT obligations than are the IAEA Board of Governors and the Director General. Finally, by downplaying Iran's violations, the Summary fails to offer an adequate contrast to the model of compliance that Libya is coming to represent.

Equally discouraging is the lack of emphasis and balance in the treatment of disarmament questions. More paragraphs of the Summary are devoted to this issue than to any other topic. It is one thing to differ with the nuclear weapon states on certain policies or on the rate of progress on disarmament. But to ignore the enormous positive strides in nuclear force reductions suggests that many countries do not fully appreciate the significance of these and other actions toward reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. We would have expected more recognition for these efforts under Article VI.

Finally, on negative security assurances, we understand the importance attached to this issue by many NPT NNWS. The United States reaffirmed its existing position on NSAs, as did other nuclear-weapon states. However, the end of the Cold War has further lessened the relevance of non-use assurances from the P-5 to the security of NPT NNWS, particularly when measured against the very real nuclear threats from NPT violators and non-state actors. We fail to see any justification for expanding NSAs to encompass global-legally binding assurances. This proposal has no relation to contemporary threats to the NPT. We did not, do not, and will not agree as stated in the Summary "that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority."

Mr. Chairman, we may all wish for consensus, but saying that we have consensus does not make it so. Faced with these deficiencies in the Summary, and with regret, the United States will not support it being annexed to the PrepCom Report. It will remain the Chair's paper, but it can have no other status. It is not a consensus document. It will not be binding on my government.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, it is time to look forward toward the Review Conference and the important consultations that must precede it.

In order to strengthen the NPT against further proliferation, there must be dedicated efforts to develop new tools and strengthen old ones to deter, detect, and deal with today's

noncompliance crisis. The NPT review process can provide political support to these efforts, but more states must recognize the need to increase support for the NPT's nonproliferation goals. To ignore the real threats to the Treaty would threaten the regime.

The United States looks forward to working with President-Designate Duarte and key NPT parties around the globe in preparing for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. We hope the Conference will focus on the critical issues facing the NPT today, and support measures to strengthen the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We should coalesce around those areas where we have common approaches and seek to reinforce new and existing tools to address the challenges before us. Where we have differences, we have to be realistic, and focus on what is achievable. In this way, the NPT will benefit, as will our collective security.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.